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CONTROL, COORDINATION AND CONFLICT ON




The effects of price stabilisation policies have been investigated for
both theoretical and empirical models. The institutional construct for
international commodity markets is that a buffer stock manager employs a
band width rule or a price adjustment rule to stabilise the world market
price. In those investigations it is assumed that the other market parti-
cipants do not react to the stabilisation activities of the buffer stock
manager.
This paper describes an international commodity market as a difference
game between buffer stock manager, producing countries and consuming coun-
tries and uses an empirical model for the world cocoa market to analyse
the effects. The feedback Nash behavioural equilibrium for this game is
compared with the optimal control outcome which ignores the strategic
behaviour in producing countries and consuming countries. It is found that
producers and consumers engage in storage activities which have a negative
effect on the stabilisation efforts of the buffer stock manager but which
decrease the operating costs of the buffer stock, decrease the revenues of
the producers and decrease the costs of the consumers.
Key words: buffer stock price stabilisation, international cocoa market,
optimal control, difference games
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') An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Second Economic
Modelling Conference, 28-30 March, 1988, London, and to the European Meeting
of the Econometric Society, 29 August-2 September, 1988, Bologna. The
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ments and to Jan Potters and Anton Markink for computational assistance.
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1. Introduction
International commodity agreements aiming at price and revenue stabilisa-
tion are a major policy issue at the meetings of the UNCTAD. Especially
during the last conferences the main if not only objective formulated in
the agreements is príce stabilisation around a long-term trend (see e.g.
UNCTAD, 1986). The desírability of price stabilisation has been an impor-
tant theoretical issue in the economic literature for a long time.
Turnovsky (1978) surveys and extends the Waugh-Oi-Massell analysis. Prices
are random due to stochastic fluctuations in demand and supply. The crite-
ria for judging the desirability of price stabilisation are the expected
producers surplus and the expected consumers surplus. The main conclusion
of the Waugh-Oi-Massell-Turnovsky analysis is that the source of the fluc-
tuations determines whether the surplus improves or deteriorates. In gene-
ral the sum of the surplusses, that is total welfare, improves. Newbery
and Stiglitz (1982) argue that the market is in fact competitive and com-
plete, because future and risk markets are redundant. This implies that
the market equilibrium is Pareto efficient, so that the optimal stabilis-
ing policy is to reproduce the storage decisions of risk neutral competi-
tive speculators with rational price forecasts. Turnovsky (1978) and
Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) emphasize that perfect price stability is
either not feasible or infinitely costly. It is better to analyse partial
adjustment policies or the optimal degree of price stabilisation. In the
literature two types of stabilisation policies are distinguished. The
first one is a band width rule, which means that the stabilising agency
intervenes when the price moves above or below an a priori specified price
band. This is the sort of rule that is suggested in the international
commodity agreements and that is referred to by Newbery and Stiglitz
(1982) as the pragmatic approach. The second one is a price adjustment
rule, which means that the stabilising agency is constantly trying to keep
the price as close as possible to an a priori specified target price path.
This is the sort of rule that also results from an optimal control ap-
proach to the stabilisation problem. Lee and Blandford (1980) use empiri-
cal models for the world cocoa and copper markets and perform an optimal
control analysis for price and revenue stabilisation. They stress the need
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to take account of the systematic trend of the price in setting the target
price path, because otherwise the attempts to stabilise are doomed to
fail. Their conclusion is that it is likely to require substantial market
intervention to produce a significant reduction in price instability,
althrugh price stability can have a favourable impact on the level and
stability of producers revenues. Ghosh, Gilbert and Hughes Hallett (1982)
construct a model of the world copper market in which the market clearing
identity is replaced with an explicit price formation mechanism. They
compare band width rules with optimal control results and conclude that
band width rules are no match for optimal stabilisation schemes. Hughes
Hallett (1986) explores the problem further. The conclusion is again that
significant stabilisation of the copper market is possible but very expen-
sive. However, in contrast with Lee and Blandford (1980) there now is no
improvement of the level of producers earnings, although the variability
can be reduced substantially. This is in line with the theoretical results
that are reported in Turnovsky (1978).
Turnovsky (19~8) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) raise the question what
the impact might be of the actions of the stabilising authority on private
speculative storage and whether the actions of private speculators might
jeopardise the desired outcome. Lee and Blandford (1980) and Hughes
Hallett (1986) also emphasize the assumption in their exercise that the
behaviour of market psrticipants is una~fected by buffer stock stabilisa-
tion. The Lucas' critique argues that this assumption is not realistic and
might lead to the wrong policy advise. This paper therefore suggests to
use a difference game approach in stead of an optimal control approach. In
this way it is possible to study the effects, when producers and consumers
can also employ storage activities in reaction to buffer stock activities
and, moreover, when the buffer stock manager realises this. It must be
stressed that the Lucas' critique is not completely resolved in this way,
because other behaviour is kept fixed in the model. The storage behaviour
of buffer stock manager, producers and consumers is modelled as an optimal
control problem and the strategic interaction is modelled as a game. It is
suggested to employ the feedback Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium con-
cept for this difference game. An algorithm which leads to this equili-
brium is given by de Zeeuw (1984). In this paper an empirical model for
the world cocoa market is used which is based on a model developed in van
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Groenendaal and Vingerhoets (1988). This model consists of estimated equa-
tions for production and consumption and for several price indices. The
optimal stabilisation policy of the buffer stock manager based on an opti-
mal control approach is compared with the Nash equilibrium between buffer
stocl: manager, producing countries and consuming countries. The idea is
that a country modelled as a strategic agent represents all strategic
activities within that country. In this Nash equilibrium the producing
countries aim at higher export prices and the consuming countries aim at
lower import prices. In the attempt to stabilise the world market price
the buffer stock manager is restricted by the available buffer stock,
which can never become negative. In their attempt to get a better export
price or import price the countries are restricted in their storage deci-
sions by assumptions about a reasonable size of the stock. The conclusions
are that both producing countries and consuming countries engage in stor-
age activities which counteract the stabilising efforts of the buffer
stock manager, although this effect is small. The buffer stock can be
successful in stabilising world market prices and revenues, but there
remains a conflict on the market which calls for further coordination.
Interesting is that the operating costs of the buffer stock decrease in
the game setting. Furthermore, when producing countries and consuming
countries are both active, the producers are worse off whereas the consu-
mers are better off.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an empirical model
for the world cocoa market. Section 3 gives algorithms for the optimal
control solution and the feedback Nash behavioural equilibrium in a linear
quadratic framework. In section 4 the price stabilisation problem is for-
mulated as an optimal control problem, when there is no speculation, and
as a Nash difference game, when there is speculation. The algorithms given
in section 2 are applied to the model presented in section 1. The results
for the optimal control formulation and the Nash difference game formula-
tion are compared. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Cocoa Model
Cocoabeans are produced in underdeveloped and less developed countries and
cocoa products are mainly consumed in developed countries. This implies
that the trade between producers and consumers typically is international
trade between countries or regions. The structure of the model reflects
this observation. The exports and imports of intermediary cocoa products
are transformed into cocoabean equivalents, so that cocoabeans are in fact
the only traded goods. Suan Tan (1984, pp. ~1-83) reviews the theory un-
derlying the construction of this type of models. The sampling period is
in principle 1960-1982 and most data originate from FAO Cocoa Statistics,
Gill 8~ Duffus Market Reports and the ICCO Quarterly Bulletin (the attached
list of symbols contains a complete description of the data sources).
The producing countries or regions are Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory
Coast, Africa Rest, Brazil, Rest South America and Asia snd Oceania. The
production of cocoabeans depends on the area planted and the average pro-
duction per acre of land. Akiyama and Duncan (1982) therefore use equa-
tions for acreage and for average production in their model. However,
since the data for acreage are not reliable (FAO, 1984), here only one
equation for production is used. Under fairly reasonable assumptions this
is anyway not a severe restriction (Ady, 1968; Bateman, 1965). The deci-
sion on a change in production is based on the development (or adaptive
expectation) of real producer prices PFI~PC as an indicator of expected
profits. The resulting specification is
(2.1) oQRt - PO t ~~80 A~}1(PFI~PC)t-j } ~lOQRt-1'
Table 1 gives the estimation results.
The consuming regions are North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe
(including the USSR) and Rest of developed World. Especially between North
Americe and Brazil there is a large trade in intermediary cocoa products.
Therefore the imports consist of cocoabeans for grindings as well as pow-
der, paste and butter transformed into cocoabean equivalents. Cocoa con-
sumption per capita CC~POP is based on real gross per capita income
GNPR~POP and on real cocoa prices. The real import price PI~PC is used to
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represent the real cocoa price. The real price of sugar PS~PC is intro-
duced to account for possible substitution or complementary products. The
resulting specification is
(2.2) (CC~POP)t - WO t c.il(GNPR~POP)t { ~2(PI~PC)t t ~3(PS~PC)t
t ~4(CC~POP)t-1'
Table 2 gives the estimation results.
The producer prices PFI are expressed in home-currency and the export
prices PE in US-dollars. Due to government policy and quality differences
these prices are not only related through the exchange rates RE. For the
same reason export prices PE and import prices PI are not equal to the
world market price PICCO. For all these price equations an autoregressive
distibuted lag model of the first order was introduced. The resulting
specifications are
(2.3) PFIt - x1PEtxREt } x2PEt-1XREt-1 } x3PFIt-1
(2.4) PEt - x1PICCOt t x2PICCOt-1 4 x3PEt-1
(2.5) PIt - x1PICCOt t x2PICCOt-1 { x3PEt-1'
Tables 3, 4 and 5 give the estimation results.
The world market cocoa price PICCO depends on the difference between world
supply and demand. Huffer stock operations eBST have a direct influence on
this difference. Supply ERWT sums up the production per country or region
minus a change oST in stocks, which is held for strategic reasons in that
country or region. Demand IRWT sums up the demand for grindings per region
plus the imports of cocoabean equivalents plus a strategically held change
~ST in stocks. Apart from stocks held for strategic reasons it is also
assumed that the consuming regions keep a fraction of the demand for grin-
dings in stock for production of cocoa products. This desired level of
stocks is set equal to the average level of stocks over the period 1968-
1980 (.225xIRWT). The definitional equation for total demand IRWT also
includes an sutonomous component CCRR to account for imports in countries
or regions, which are not modelled explicitly. Differences in world supply
and demand will also create changes oSTWT in free stocks of cocoabean
equivalents (the factor .99 accounts for transportation losses). These
free stocks will influence the world market price in as far as they differ
from the desired level of stocks. Changing demand will induce a change in
the desired level of stocks (.225x~IRWT). This will lead to a change in
the demand for stocks and therefore this term is added to demand IRWT in
the specification for the world market cocoa price. Since markets are not
independent the commodity price index CPI is included in the specification
in order to separate the effect of differences in supply and demand on the
cocoa market from the spill-over effects from other markets. Indicators
for the instability of monetary variables did not have any significant
influence. The relevant definitional equations and the resulting specifi-
cation for the world market cocoa price are
(2.6) ERWTt - ~8-1[QRt~ - 4STt~] (World SuPP1Y)
(2.~) IRWTt - ~i41[CCti } ~Tti] }
CCRRt (World Demand)
(2.8) STWTt - STWTt-1 t[.99xERWTt - IRWTt - eBST] (World Stocks)
(2.9) PICCOt - a1CPIt - a2[ERWTt - (IRWTt t .225XAIRWTt) - ~BSTt]
- a3[STW'I't-1- .225XIRWTt-1] } a4PICCOt-1"
Table 6 gives the estimation result.
The global structure of the model is as follows. The non-controllable
exogenous variables are the commodity price indices PC I'or each country or
region, real income GNPR and population size POP for each consuming re-
gion, an autonomous import component CCRR, the general commodity price
index CPI, the price index for sugar PS and the exchange rates RE. The
instrumental variables are the change OBST in the buffer stock and the
changes 4ST in stocks for each country or region. These instrumental vari-
ables were set equal to zero in the estimation procedures. The endogenous
variables are productíon QR, the producer price index PFI and the export
price index PE for each producing country or region, consumption CC and
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the import price index PI for each consuming region, total exports ERWT,
total imports IRWI', free stocks STW'I' and the world market price index
PZCCO. Given time paths for the non-controllable exogenous variables and
for the instrumental variables the model generates tiroe paths for the
endogenous variables from an appropríate set of initial values. The model
is linear in the endogenous and instrumental variables. Non-linearities
such as the transformation from nominal to real variables or from US-dol-
lars to home-currency are reflected in the time-varying coefficients of an
essentially linear model.
In order to be able to apply control algorithms the model is rewritten in
state-space form. This means that the set of higher-order difference equa-
tions is rewritten as a set of first-order difference equations by stack-
ing lagged endogenous and instrumental varíables into a state vector and
by solving this set of equations for the state transition. The result is
(2.10) xttl - Atxt t~i3lBtut t zt,
where x is the state vector and ul the instrumental vector for market
participant i, i-1,...,13, and where the exogenous influences are reflec-
ted in the time-varying parameters A, B and z. The state vector consists
of all the endogenous variables with one lag and the producer price in-
dices PFI up to their maxímum lag, which adds up to ~5 elements. The in-
strumental vectors have only one element. The objective variable of the
buffer stock manager is the world market price. In the game exercises in
sections 3 and 4 the producing countries or regions have as objective
variable their export price index and the consuming regions their import
price index. Since these objective variables form a subset of the state
variables the vector y of objective variables can be written as
(2.11) y - Cx.
In section 3 control and game algorithms are given for the abstract model
(2.10)-(2.11). In section 4 these algorithms are applied to the underlying
world cocoa model (2.1)-(2.9).
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3. Difference Game Methodology
The objective of the buffer stock manager is to keep the world market
price as close as possible to an a priori specified target price path by
selling and buying on the world market. Therefore the basic part of the
objective functional of the buffer stock manager consists of squared de-
viations of the world market price path PICCO from thi.s target price path
PICCO. The interventions of the buffer stock manager are restricted by the
available buffer stock and~or the available budget. An optimal degree of
price stabilisation can be found by using as objective functional the
weighted sum of squares over a fixed planning horizon
(3-1) ~t-1L9(PICCOt - PICCOt)2 4 r(ABSTt)2].
A high value for the relative priority q~r will generally lead to a good
stabilisation result with strong interventions, whereas a low value for
q~r will generally lead to a bad stabilisation result with minor interven-
tions. Given the restrictions on interventions there will generally be a
best stabilisation result corresponding with an optimal value for the
relative priority q~r.
The objective functionals of the other market participants are formulated
in the same way with the world market price replaced by the export price
for the producing countries or regions and by the import price for the
consuming regions. These objective functionals reflect the idea that,
although producing and consuming countries and regions participate in the
buffer stock in order to stabilise prices, there may be additional storage
activities in these countries and regions in order to try to get higher
export prices or lower import prices. This leads to a strategic inter-
action between buffer stock manager, producers and consumers, which can be
modelled as a difference game. In terms of the state-space form (2.10)-
(2.11) of the model this difference game consists of the objective func-
tionals
(3.2) Ji(ul....,u13) :- ~t-1~(Yt - Yt)~Qt(Yt - Yt) t ut1Rtut] .
i-1. . .13.
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iand the constraints (2.10)-(2.11), where y are the vectors of target
price paths and where the diagonal matrices Q1 are semi-positive definite
and the scalars R1 are positive. The quadratic form of the objective func-
tionals implies that deviations above and below the target paths are
equally punished. This is a suitable type of criterium for stabilisation
purposes. However, in ttiis game it is not the objective of producers and
consumers to stabilise prices, but to get higher export prices or lower
import prices. A way out is to set the target path of export (import)
prices high (low) enough so that the resulting price path remains below
(above) the target price path. The precise choice of the target paths as
well as the relative priorities q~r must again be motivated by the desir-
ability and the feasibility of the outcomes (see also section 4).
Suppose the buffer stock manager is labelled as player 1, the producing
countries or regions are labelled as players 2,...,9 and the consuming
regions are labelled as players 10,...,13. In case Q1-0, i-2,...,13, the
producing and consuming countries and regions do not act and there remains
an optimal control problem for the buffer stock manager.
The behavioural equilibrium concept used to solve the difference game is
the noncooperative Nash concept. It is important to distinguish between
the Nash solution with only initial state information and with binding
commitments and the Nash solution with current state information and with-
out binding commitments (Ba~ar and Olsder, 1982; de Zeeuw and van der
Ploeg, 1987). The first one is called the open-loop Nash solution and the
second one ís called the feedback Nash or subgame-perfect solution. Since
it seems more realistic to assume the use of current state information and
no binding commitments, the feedback Nash solution is employed here. This
behavioural equilibrium is found by solving static Nash games in a dynamic
programming framework. The equilibrium strategíes are given by (de Zeeuw,
1984)
(3.3) ut(x) :- ctx t ht . i-1,....13.
where
(3.4) Gt :- -[Rt~-1B~~Ktt1[Ettl~-lAt
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(3.5) ht :- -[R~]-1B~
{K~}1[Et}1]-1(zt - ~~31Bt[R~]-1B~ g~}1) } g~}1}
(3.6) Et;l :- I t ~13 B~[R~]-1B~'K~~-1 t t t t41
and where K1 satisfy the coupled backward recursive Riccati-type matrix
equations
(3.7)
i , i '' -1 i i i-1 i' i -1
Kt - C QtC t At[Et41] (I ; Kt~1BtLRt] Bt IKt~1CEtt1] At.
KTt1- 0
and gl satisfy the coupled backward recursive tracking equations
gt - -C~QtYt ' At[Et,l]-1(I
} Kit}1B~[Rit]-1B~~)
(3.8) {K1 [E ]-1(z - ~13 B~[R~]-1B~ g~ ) 4 gl }ttl ttl t ~-1 t t t ttl ttl
1 - 0.gTtl
The variable x in the strategy representations (3.3) denotes the state
information at time t. In a simulation it is assumed that the players
observe the simulated state vector.
4. Cocoa Market as a Came
In this section two strategic interventions on the international cocoa
market are compared. In the first one a buffer stock manager tries to
stabilise the world market price by selling and buying on the world market
from an available buffer stock. In the second one producers and consumers
take account of these buffer stock activities nnd consider to intervene
for Lhemselves aiming at higher export prices or lower import prices. The
buffer stock manager realizes this, so that the three market participants
play a Nash game between them. In the first exercise the buffer stock
mana er em lo s the o timal control strate 1g p y p gy u given by equations (3.3)-
(3.8) with Q1-0, i-2,...,13. In the second exercise the players employ the
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set of Nash strategies ul, i-1,...,13, also given by equations (3.3)-
(3.8). Both control and Nash game algorithms start from the model parame-
ters (At'Bt'zt), the initial state vector xl, the target paths yl and the
relative priorities (Q1,R1).
The target path for the world market price should reflect the idea that
the buffer stock manager only tries to counter undesirable market forces
on the international cocoa market and not the spill-over effects from
other markets. Therefore this target path is constructed as follows (see
for other ideas for the construction of target price paths Lee and
Blandford, 1980; Ghosh, Gilbert and Hughes Hallett, 1982; Hughes Hallett,
1986). Firstly, the world market price PICCO is simulated with the cocoa
model from section 2 and a trend is determined. Secondly, the world market
price PICCO is simulated with equation (2.9) in which a2 and a3 are set
equal to zero, which implies market equilibrium, and again a trend is
determined. Finally, the deviations from trend in the second simulation
are added to the trend found in the first simulation. The resulting price
path is taken as target path for the world market cocoa price. It seems
logical to use this target path and equations (2.4) and (2.5) to construct
target paths for the export and import prices. However, this would typic-
ally lead to additional stabilisation efforts and not to the sort of con-
flict that is supposed to be analysed here. In that conflict producers and
consumers are trying to get higher export prices and lower import prices,
respectively, and not stable prices. They aim at a better result than what
they would get when they do nothing. Therefore, the construction of these
target paths is based on the resulting price paths From the control expe-
riment. The target paths for export prices are set lOX higher than what
comes out of the control experiment and the target paths for import prices
are set lOx lower.
The control experiment is set up as follows. The buffer stock manager is
given an initial buffer stock of 100,000 mt. The relative priority Q11~R1
is determined by experiment. The value of R1 is arbitrarily set at 10.
Starting at 0 the value of Qil is gradually increased until the accumu-
lated buffer stock changes just hit the ceiling of 100,000 mt somewhere in
the sampling period, which happens for Qi1-30. This ís the best stabilisa-
tion result the buffer stock manager can achieve with the available buffer
stock. The results are presented in table ~.
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The game experiment is essentially set up in the same way. The values of
R1, i-2,...,13, are also arbitrarily set at 10. The values of Qii'
i-2,...,13, are also gradually increased starting at 0 until the accumu-
lated interventions on the producers' side and the consumers' side unrea-
listically exceed a preset value of about 140,000 mt. From the experiments
it is found that an increasing Qii, which must lead to higher export pri-
ces and lower import prices, respectively, also leads to more income for
the producing countries and regions and less costs for the consuming re-
gions. This implies that prices are a good indicator for revenues and
costs, so that the experiment was set up realistically in that respect in
the first place. It remains to be seen what happens when both producers
and consumers try to improve their situation by speculative actions.
The results of the game experiment are presented in three steps. Firstly,
there is only a game between buffer stock manager and producing countries
and regions in which the consuming regions remain passive. This game is
called game 1. Secondly, there is only a game between buffer stock manager
and consuming regions in which the producing countries and regions remain
passive. This game is called game 2. Finally, the game between the three
market participants is called game 3. It is found that in the games with
consuming regions there is some more room for the buffer stock manager to
operate. In these games the value of Qil can be increased to 35. In game 1
the preset boundary for the producing countries and regions is hit for
Qii-6' i-2,...,9. In game 2 the preset boundary for the consuming regions
is hit for Qii-10, i-10,...,13. In game 3 the preset boundaries are hit
for Qii-5, i-2,...,9, and Qii-9, i-10,...,13. It is possible to vary the
values of Qii over the different countries and regions and over time. An
idea is to relate these values to the size of the trade of each country
and region, so that the resulting interventions will also be related to
the size of the trade. It proves that the market results remain essential-
ly the same. The reason is that the interventions of the producers as a
group and of the consumers as a group remain essentially the same. The
results with these values for Qii are presented in table 8 for game 1,
table 9 for game 2 and table 10 for game 3.
The first conclusion from the figures in tables ~-10 is that the pattern
of the buffer stock interventions is the same in all four experiments. The
buffer stock manager starts to sell for three periods, then buys for three
periods, then sells again for four or five periods and ends up buying. In
total the buffer stock manager is a seller. The producing countries or
regions are predominantly withholding to lower supply in order to increase
prices and the consuming regions are predominantly using up their stocks
to lower demand in order to decrease prices, which is to be expected.
As an indicator for the degree of stabilisation the sum of absolute dif-
ferences between the values of the resulting price path and the correspon-
ding values of the target price path is used. The optimal control solution
leads to a good stabilisation result. This result is somewhat better than
for the game solutions. However, the stabilisation indices for the games
with consumers are almost as good as for the optimal control solution,
whereas the stabilisation index for the game with only producers is quite
a bit worse. This means that the destabilising effect is mainly due to the
storage activities in the producing countries and regions.
The net sales from the buffer stock are the lowest in the game with only
consumers and the highest in the game with only producers. However, this
does not mean that the buffer stock manager is less active in game 2. On
the contrary, the sum of interventions in absolute terms is the highest in
game 2 and the lowest in game 1. What it does imply is that there will be
less costs to replenish the buffer stock up to the initial level of
100,000 mt. These costs are calculated by multiplying the required quanti-
ty with a simulated world market price. In this simulation it is assumed
that every market participant has to restore its initial endowment, which
determines fictitious supply and demand, and that there are enough buyers
or sellers.
In order to get an indicator for the costs of operating the buffer stock
the net inward cash flow into the buffer stock has to be substracted from
these replenishment costs. The costs of operating the buffer stock are the
lowest for the game with only producers (game 1). The interventions of the
producers induce an upward pressure on the world market price, which leads
to a very high net inward cash flow into the buffer stock. These revenues
outweigh the high replenishment costs for this game. The costs of operat-
ing the buffer stock are also very low for the game with producers and
consumers (game 3). The interventions of the producers and consumers al-
most cancel out, so that the world market price path changes only slightly
as compared to the price path in the optimal control solution. Therefore
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the net inward cash Flow into the buffer stock is almost the same. How-
ever, the replenishment costs are much lower. The costs of operating the
buffer stock for the game with only consumers (game 2) are higher than for
the other two games but still lower than for the optimal control solution.
The interventions of the consumers induce a downward pressure on the world
market price, which leads to a low net inward cash flow into the buffer
stock. However, the replenishment costs are much lower, since there re-
mains a large buffer stock at the end, and this outweighs the lower reve-
nues.
The results of game 1 and game 2 show that the producers and consumers
actually benefit from their actions. The pursuit of higher export prices
and lower import prices leads to higher revenues and lower costs, respec-
tively. The group that remains passive has a loss. The differences between
the gains of the one group and the losses of the other are due to the way
in which the market is modelled, when the market participants restore
their initial endowments. The differences are a gain or a loss of ficti-
tious traders. The results of game 3 show that when producers and consu-
mers are both active the producers are worse off than in the optimal con-
trol solution. The reason is that the attempts of both groups to improve
their situation approximately cancel out, so that withholding and dumping
implies a loss. On the other hand, the consumers are better off, because
they restore their used stocks at a favourable price. The values are,
however, rather small.
These budget considerations are important to put the results with respect
to the stabilisation issue in the right perspective. Although the general
conclusion is that the buffer stock stabilisation activities are less
successful when producing and consuming countries and regions also employ
storage activities for their own sake, this conclusion is weakened by the
fact that the operating costs of the buffer stock are much lower. Further-
more, the producers have lower revenues and the consumers have lower
costs. A topic of further research will be to make an overall cost and
benefit analysis and to see if the results are robust for reasonable vari-
ations in the target paths and the relative priorities. Finally, the issue
of coordination through the buffer stock and conflict on the market after-
wards could be analysed further with other noncooperative and cooperative
game theoretic solution concepts.
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5. Conclusion
This paper tries to answer the question what happens if agents in produ-
cing and consuming countríes are still strategically active on the inter-
national cocoa market, although the countries coordinate their stabilising
efforts through a buffer stock manager. An empirical model for the world
cocoa market is constructed and the optimal control solution for the buf-
fer stock manager is compared with feedback Nash or subgame-perfect game
equilibria between buffer stock manager, producers and consumers. The
conclusion is that the stabilising efforts are partly offset by the stra-
tegic activities of the other market participants. However, the costs of
operating the buffer stock decrease and some other market participants are
better off. A further treatment of the trade-off between the stabilisation
result, on the one hand, and costs and revenues, on the other hand, and
the study of other game equilibria are left for further research.
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eQRt - ~0 t ~~80 ~~ti(PFI~PC)t-~ } ~lOQRt-1 ~ ~11HYt-4 } ~12t t ~~3DU65
country ")
or CA GH NI IC AR BR RA AO
region
o
170.5 . 115.0 . 76.3 143.4 -46.0
~ . (4.5) . (5.6) . (2-2) (3.6) (-3.4)
gi .36 . 3.46 2.02 . . . .
t (3.6) . (7-4) (5.7) . . . .
g2 . 1.97 . -2.02 . .38 .14 .
t . (3.9) . (-.-) . (2.8) (z.4) .
~ . -.89 1.05 . . . . .
t3 . (-1.6) . . . . . .
~4 . . -1.48 . . . .18 .
t . . . . . . (2.1) .
~5 . . . . . . . .
~
6
. 1.17 -2.82 1.61 . . .17 .05
t . (2.2) (-6.3) (5.1) . . (2.7) (1.6)
s . -2.18 . -1.55 . . . .06
t7 . (-3.3) . (-3.6) . . . .
~8
1.10 .13 . -.31
t . . . (2.4) (2.1) . (-2.3) .
g . .98 1.89 -1.16 . . . .
t9 . (3.2) (6.3) (-.-) . . . .
S10 -.38 -.75 -.90 -.59 -.17 -.57 -.85 -.48
t (-3-3) (-6.4) (-8.7) (-5.1) (-2.2) (-2.7) (-3.7) (-2.2)
~11 . 163.2 14o.i -46.8 . . . .t . (4.5) (4.9) (-2.1) . . . .
g12 . . . 803.5 . 197.0 . .
t . . . (6.0) . (1.4) . .
~
1
. . . . . . . 2.52
t 3 . . . . . . . (3.1)
R2 .41 .87 .86 .93 .22 .45 .60 .57
~`) The following restrictions were introduced: p1- ~82, and p9- ~6t ~7t
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Remark: In addition to the variables of section 2, three other factors
were íntroduced. Firstly, a dummy variable DU65 for the year 1965, in
which year the weather conditions were extremely good. Secondly, a vari-
able HY which represents a change in technology due to the introduction of
hybrids. Thirdly, a time trend t for Asia and Oceania, which reflects the
policy of increasing the acreage for cocoatrees by the local governments.
Table 2: Consumption
CC~POPt - w~ t wl(GNPR~POP)t t w2(PI~PC)t t w3(PS~PC)t . w4(CC~POP) 1t-
country




. .70 . .30
t . (4.3) . (2.9)
w
l
.10 .06 2.48 .08
t (2.6) (2.6) (4.3) (2.8)
w
2
-.17 -.08 -.38 -.11
t (-2.9) (-3.2) (-4.3) (-2.8)
w
3
-.35 -.13 . .
t (-2.55) (-1.8) . .
w4 .78 .49 .30 .51
t (7.1) (3-9) (i.6) (3.1)
R2 .78 .77 .78 .82
Remark: For Eastern Europe and the USSR there are no figures on the price
of consumption. Therefore PI and PS were used instead of the relative
prices.
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Table 3: Producer prices
PFIt - x1PEtXREt t x2PEt-1xREt-1 i x3PFIt-1
country
or CA GH NI IC AR BR RA AO
region
xl .05 .18 . .07 .12 .74 . .
t (1.8) (5.7) . (1.1) (2.6) (20.3)
x
2
.15 . .21 .16 .lo -.45 . .
t (3.6) . (2.6) (2.2) (1.2) (-2.4)
x
3
.63 .63 .79 .59 .65 .60 . .
t (7.7) (6.6) (5.1) (4.4) (4.0) (2.1)
R2 .99 .98 .98 .97 .98 .99
Remark: For the Rest of South America (RA) and Asia and Oceania (AO) pro-
ducer prices are not known. It is assumed that for these regions producer
prices are equal to export prices in home-currency: PFI - PExER. For the
rest of Africa an index (1975 - 100) was used based on the sum of producer
prices in US-dollars, weighted with the production.
Table 6: The world market cocoa price
PICCOt - a1CPIt - a2[ERWTt - (IRWTt t .225XeIRWTt)]
- a3[STWTt-1- .225xIRwTt-1] t a4PICCOt-1 ; a5DU77
para-
meter
al a2 a3 a4 a5 R2
value .85 .22 .06 .71 145.29
t (3.1) (3.6) (2.0) (6.5) (6.4)
.97
J
Remark: A dummy variable DU77 for the yeaL~ !~?ï7 was introduced to account
for the extreme increase in PICCO in that year.
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Table 4: Export prices
PEt - KIPICCOt t x2PICCOt-1 t x3PEt-1
country
or CA GFí NI IC AR BR RA AO
region
x .58 .36 .72 .49 .43 1.08 .93 .81
tl (9.6) (5.4) (7-0) (8.5) (8.4) (22.0) (84.5) (24.6)
x
2
.32 .62 . .38 .43 -.12 . .08
t (5-I) (9.1) . (6.5) (8-3) (-2.4) (2.5)
x
3
. . .17 . . . . .
t . . (1.4) . . .
R2 -98 .98 .92 .98 -98 .99 -99 -99
Table 5: Import prices
PIt - x1PICCOt ~ x2PICCOt-1 t x3PEt-1
country




.54 .56 .54 .74
t (11.1) (14.2) (8.6) (15.4)
x
2
.51 .36 .50 .32









R2 -99 -99 -99 -99
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Table 7: Optimal control solution
year ~BST simulated target controlled
PICCO PICCO PICCO
1968 -13.83 64.16 69.29 61.85
1969 -41.67 86.86 78.20 79.86
1970 -29.49 94.21 85.60 90.23
1971 15.oi 77.58 89.58 84.65
1972 43.51 63.15 96.28 76.68
1973 19.18 ii6.70 ii8.09 12z.oo
197~E -18.33 187.60 147.23 179.30
1975 -33.56 212.80 156.78 197.30
1976 -29.36 215.20 170.48 zoo.io
1977 -17.63 369.30 337.47 360.30
1978 4.76 305.60 307.36 310.00
1979 20.46 271.60 297.ii 289.30
1980 28.66 225.00 297.46 z46.5o
~6á - -52.29
min {BSTt} - BST77 - -6.17
operating costs : 59,073,000.- US-dollars
inward cash flow : 75,728,000.- US-dollars
stabilisatíon index ( simulation) : 341.59
stabilisation index ( control) : 228.62
Remark: The stabilisation index is defined as ~8o IPICCO - PICCO~. The
operating costs for the buffer stock manager are tdé~8ned as
~ao68oBSTtxPICCOt ; (BST67- BST80)(PICC080- [-.216x(BST67- BST80)].
The first term is the total yearly outward cash flow from selling and
buying. The second term represents the costs for restoring the buffer
stock at its initial level. The warehouse costs of the buffer stock are
not taken into account .
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Table 8: Game between buffer stock and~roducers ~ame 1~
year ~BST ~8-1~Ti ~i-1~STi inteovention PICCO
1968 - 5.96 - 5.77 0.0 -11.73 62.20
1969 -32.02 0.44 0.0 -3i.58 8i.56
1970 -27.44 8.18 0.0 -1g.26 91.84
~971 9.26 10.75 0.0 20.01 84.55
1972 37.67 6.92 0.0 44.59 75.31
1973 17.98 2.81 0.0 20.79 i21.1o
1974 -16.08 2.92 0.0 -13.16 ~80.10
1975 -31.57 6.81 0.0 -24.76 199.70
1976 -30.25 15.12 0.0 -15.13 204.30
1977 -22.42 26.82 0.0 4.40 366.40
1978 - 1.55 28.24 0.0 26.69 316.00
1979 15-9o z5.16 0.0 4i.o6 293.70
1980 27.68 13.13 0.0 40.81 248.20
F68 - -58.80 141.53 0.0 82.73
min {BSTt} - BST78 - -2.38
operating costs . 12,93z,000.- US-dollars
inward cash flow . 122,502,000.- US-dollars
benefits producers : 500,007,000.- US-dollars
benefits consumers : -245,125,000.- US-dollars
stabilisation index : 245.55
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Table 9: Game between buffer stock and consumers (game 2)
year eBST ~8-10STi ~i-1~Ti inteovention PICCO
1968 -13.30 0.0 4.58 - 8.72 62.88
1969 -35.52 0.0 - 2.70 -38.22 80.17
1970 -24.11 0.0 - 9.22 -33.33 88.75
1971 16.99 0.0 - 9.65 7.34 82.58
1972 43.98 0.0 - 5.13 38.85 76.25
1973 16.78 0.0 - 1.49 15.29 122.80
1974 -22.46 0.0 - 2.34 -24.80 179.40
1975 -36.41 0.0 - 7.08 -43.49 196.10
1976 -28.69 0.0 -16.07 -44.76 196.90
1977 -14.73 0.0 -25.87 -40.60 354.20
1978 9.73 0.0 -28.23 -18.50 302.20
1979 25.77 0.0 -24.83 0.94 282.80
1980 34.35 0.0 -12.02 22.33 245.10
~68 - -27.62 0.0 -140.05 -167.67
min {BSTt} - BST77 - z.53
operating costs . 53,749,000.- US-dollars
inward cash flow . 23.950,000.- US-dollars
benefits producers : -542,746,000.- US-dollars
benefits consumers : 212,358,000.- US-dollars
stabilisation index : 229.74
z5
Table 10: Game between buffer stock, producers and consumers (game 3)
year eBST ~8-1~Ti ~i-1~Ti inteorvention PICCO
1968 - 8.29 - 5.65 4.86 - 9.08 62.83
1969 -30.71 0.94 - 3.06 -32.83 81.05
1970 -z4.26 8.73 -10.07 -25.60 90.11
1971 12.48 10.50 -10.14 12.84 83.18
1972 40.16 5.46 - 4.71 40.91 75.69
1973 16.66 1.06 - 0.48 17.24 122.10
1974 -20.25 1.82 - 1.52 -19.95 179.70
1975 -34.84 6.41 - 7.00 -35.43 197-70
1976 -29.86 14.95 -16.93 -31.84 200.10
1977 -19.41 26.59 -27.54 -20.36 359.40
1978 3.57 28.14 -30.22 1.49 308.10
1979 20.98 24.31 -26.17 19.12 z87.6o
1980 33.01 11.80 -12.35 32.46 247.10
F68 -40.76 135.06 -145.31 -51.02
min {sSTt} - sST77 - 1.68
operating costs . 32,499,000.- US-dollars
inward cash flow . 72,712,000.- US-dollars
benefits producers : -61,614,000.- US-dollars
benefits consumers : 21,121,000.- US-dollars
stabilisation index : 230.37
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List of symbols
BST Buffer stock in 1000mt.
CC Consumption of cocoa in 1000 mt.
Calculated by adding grindings and imports in bean equivalents of
the various consuming areas. CCRR is obtained by substracting the
consumption in the other four areas from world grindings.
FAO Cocoa Statistics (1951-1973) and Gill 8~ Duffus Market Report
(1974-1985)
CPI Commodity price index (1980 - 100).
International Financial Statistics, 1953-1985
ERWT World supply of cocoa beans: ~8-1QR~ - 4ST~.
IRWT World demand for cocoa beans: ~~-1CC~ - 45T~.
GNPR Gross national product in purchasers values in billions of US-
dollars ( at exchange rates and prices levels of 1975).
Data available for the period 1960-1982 for Western Europe and
North America. For the the rest of the developed world we used the
data from Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The source is OECD
National Accounts. For Eastern Europe and the USSR the data are
taken from the Year-book of National Accounts ( available as an
index (1975 - 100) for the period 1960-1980).
OECD National Accounts and Yearbook of National Accounts.
HY Percentage of total area planted with cocoa that is planted with
hybrid varieties. This is defined only for Ivory Coast and Brazil.
'World Cocoa Production, Consumption and Price Prospectives' by
M.J. Bateman, Mimeo. Period 1966-1983.
PC Index of consumption prices (1975 - 100).
For the consuming regions this index is calculated by dividing
nominal private consumption per region by real private consumption
per region at 1975 prices and exchange rates from the OECD National
Accounts for the period 1960-1982. For Eastern Eiirope and the USSR
no data are available. For the producing countries data are
available per country for the period 1953-1984 (except for Cameroon
and Ivory Coast) from the International Financial Statistics. For
Cameroon and Ivory Coast data for the missing years (1953-1962 and
1953-1960 respectively) were constructed by regressing the index
for each country on the index for total Africa and 'predict' the
missing observations. For the three remaining areas data are
constructed as follows:
Africa Rest, the consumer index for total Africa, period 1953-1984.
Asia and Oceania, the consumer price index for total Asia, period
1953-1984.
Rest America, the average of the consumer price indices (weighted
with production of beans) of Ecuador, Mexico and the Dominican
Republic, period 1956-1984.
OECD National Accounts and International Financial Statistics.
PE Unit value of exports in US-dollarcents per kilo.
Nominal exports are divided by real exports in 19~5 prices.
FAO Cocoa Statistics and FAO Trade Yearbook. 1956-1982.
PFI Index of producer prices in home-currency (1975 - 100).
Producer prices in home-currency are available for countries. For
Africa Rest a weighted average of producer prices in US dollar
cents of the four other countries is used. Producer prices for the
Rest of South America and Asia and Oceania are set equal to export
prices. Data are available for: Cameroon (1958-1982), Ghana (1953-
1982), Ivory Coast (195~-1982), Nigeria (1953-1982), Brazil (1966-
1982).
Gill ~ Duffus Market Report.
PI Unit value of imports in US-dollarcents per kilo.
Nominal imports are divided by real imports in 19~5 prices.
FAO Cocoa Statistics and FAO Trade Yearbook. 1955-1982 (except for
Eastern Europe and the USSR, 1965-1982).
PICCO Annual average of daily prices of cocoabeans in US-dollarcents per
kilo.
FAO Cocoa Statistics and Quaterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics,
1960-1985.
POP Population in millions.
OECD National Accounts and Yearbook oF National Accounts,196o-1982.
PS Price of sugar on the world market in US-dollarcents per kilo.
Trends ~ Prices, 1960-1982.
QR Production of cocoabeans in 1000 mt per annum (1 oct. - 30 sept.).
FAO Cocoa Statistics and ICCO Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa
Statistics, 1951-1985.
RE Rate of exchange in units per US-dollar (for regions RE equals 1).
International Financial Statistics, 1953-1985.
ST Strategic stocks held by a producing and consuming countries.
STW'I' Free world stocks of cocoabeans in 1000 mt.
Calculated starting from 196o stocks as reported by Gill ~ Duffus.
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